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SUPERSEDING THE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS IN
NEW YORK CITY-TBE CONSTITUTIONALITY
AND LEGALITY OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 55
ROBERT M. PITLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
0 N September 19, 1972, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller issued five
executive orders1 directing the Attorney General of the State of
New York to appoint a special deputy attorney general to supersede each
of the district attorneys in the five counties of New York City in all cases
relating to corruption in the administration of criminal justice in that
city. The orders were made pursuant to section 63 of the Executive Law,
which is based on the Governor's constitutional obligation to assure that
the laws are faithfully executed 3 In calling for the appointment of a
special prosecutor, the Governor was acting on a recommendation made
by New York City's Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police
Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedure ("Knapp Com-
mission").'
The purpose of this article is to consider the constitutionality and
legality of the executive order. This will entail a brief survey of the his-
torical development of the offices of district attorney and attorney general
in New York, followed by an analysis of two potential limitations on the
* Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. LL.B., Brooklyn
Law School; LL.M., S.J.D., University of Michigan Law School. Professor Pitler is the
author of New York Criminal Procedure Under the CPL (1972), and is a member of the
New York Bar.
1. Executive Orders Nos. 55 (New York Co.), 56 (Bronx Co.), 57 (Queens Co.), 58
(Kings Co.), 59 (Richmond Co.) 9A N.Y.C.R.R. § 1.44 (1972) [hereinafter collectively
referred to as Executive Order No. 55]. The orders are identical except for reference to a
specific county.
2. N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(2) (McKinney 1972); see Exec. Order No. 55(I).
3. See N.Y. Const. art. 4, § 3.
4. Executive Order No. 55(I). The Knapp Commission was established in May, 1970
by Executive Order of New York City Mayor John V. Lindsay. Its primary function was
to determine the nature and extent of police corruption in the City, examine the City's
procedures for dealing with corruption, and to recommend changes and improvements in
those procedures. Executive Order No. 11, § I, N.Y. City Record, vol. XCVIII, at 3583 (May
21, 1970). In its Summary and Principal Recommendations, issued August 3, 1972, the
Commission proposed "that the Governor, acting with the Attorney General pursuant to
§ 63 of the Executive Law, appoint a Special Deputy Attorney General with jurisdiction
in the five counties of the City and authority to investigate and prosecute all crimes
involving corruption in the criminal process2' Commission to Investigate Allegations of
Police Corruption, Commission Report 15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Commison Report].
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Governor's power of superseder, viz., the right of localities to govern
themselves, and a district attorney's right, under the state constitution,
to notice and a hearing before he can be removed. The Summary and
Principal Recommendations of the Knapp Commission, upon which the
Governor relied as the basis for his executive order, will then be briefly
discussed. Finally, the legal implications of the order will be analyzed.
II. THE OFFICES OF ATTORNEY GENERAL AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY
IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
A. Evolution
While the state government has exercised prosecutorial power since
the colonial era, the earliest assignment of the responsibilities of prosecu-
tion extended only to the office of attorney general. The office of district
attorney was a later, direct evolution from the office of attorney general.
The Dutch colony of New Netherland was governed by a Council of
Five, under the executive aegis of a governor. Attached to the Council
was an officer known as the "schout-fiscal," who served in a prosecutorial
capacity, as well as performing the executive function of sheriff., The
office continued in existence even after the English succeeded to the con-
trol of the colony in 1664. However, in the following year the prosecutorial
function of the schout-fiscal was eliminated, and the office became, in
practical effect, that of "sheriff," the title by which it was denominated
under English rule.6
As English control became more firmly established in the New York
Colony, the colonial form of government began more closely to parallel
the English mode. Consequently, an attorney general was designated to
exercise the prosecutorial function.7 By 1774, the office of "His Majesty's
Attorney General of the Province" was similar to that of the chief pros-
ecutor in England, and, as Governor William Tryon reported in that year,
the King had "'no Soliciter General nor Council in the Province, to assist
the Attorney General upon any Occasion.' ,,8
In 1777, the government of New York was significantly altered by the
5. 1 C. Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York State 455 (1905) [hereinafter cited
by volume as Lincoln]. The office of sheriff remained functional from 1626 until 1637.
Beginning in 1638, due to two repressive regimes in the colony, the office remained either
vacant or non-functioning until 1653. In that year, in response to public demand Governor
Peter Stuyvesant appointed Cornelius Van Tinhoven, a local resident, who performed
the combined functions of the modern sheriff and district attorney. Id. at 455-56.
6. Id. at 458-60.
7. 2 Lincoln 526.
8. Letter of Governor William Tryon to the Home Government, June 11, 1774, quoted
in 1 Lincoln 37, 41; see J. Goebel & T. Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial New York
319-20 (1944); P. Hamlin & C. Baker, Supreme Court of Judicature of the Province of
New York 1691-1704, at 121-23 (1959). See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *304.
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termination of its colonial status and the adoption of its first constitution.
Although the Constitution of 1777 made no provision for an office of
attorney general, the Constitutional Convention appointed one Egbert
Benson to this position. 9 From 1777 until the adoption of New York's
second constitution in 1821, the office of attorney general was filled by
appointees of the Council of Appointment."0 With the adoption of the
Constitution of 1821, the attorney general was nominated and appointed
by joint action of the Senate and Assembly.'
Notwithstanding this change in the method of appointment, the at-
torney general continued for a considerable period to prosecute criminal
actions in the name of the state. However, the duties of his office were
considerably reduced in 1796 by creation of the office of assistant at-
torney general." These officers, appointed by the governor, generally
attended to the criminal courts and conducted criminal prosecutions,
although the attorney general retained this function in the county of
New York. 3 This method of prosecuting criminal cases continued until
1801, when the legislature statutorily created the office of district at-
torney,'4 and prescribed his functions and duties. The office was essen-
tially the same as the former assistant attorney general position.
Like the assistant attorneys general, district attorneys were appointed
by the governor, and conducted criminal prosecutions within their dis-
tricts in the name of the state. As under the assistant attorney general
system, the prosecution of crimes within New York City remained the
exclusive province of the attorney general.' 5
There were only insignificant changes in this system between 1801 and
1821. With passing years, more districts were created; in 1815 the
county of New York was made a district; and in 1818 a statute was
passed providing for a district attorney for each county. 6
9. The Council of Appointment, which was responsible for the selection of all non-
constitutional officers was composed of the governor, who had the right to nominate, but
no other vote, and one senator from each district, selected by the Assembly. N.Y. Const.
art. XXIII (1777). A dispute as to whether the governor possessed the exclusive right to
nominate was resolved by the Constitutional Convention of 1801, which vested concurrent
nominating power in the governor and each member of the Council. 1 Lincoln 612. Because
the Council became so unrestrained and irresponsible in dispensing patronage, it was
abolished by unanimous vote in the Constitutional Convention of 1821. Id. at 749. At that
time the primary responsibility for appointing state officers was vested in the Legislature.
N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 6 (1821).
10. 2 Lincoln 527.
11. N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 6 (1821).
12. Law of Feb. 12, 1796, ch. VIII, [1796] N.Y. Laws 265.
13. 2 Lincoln 529.
14. Law of Apr. 4, 1801, ch. CXLVI, [1801] N.Y. Laws 461.
15. Id.
16. Law of Apr. 21, 1818, ch. CCLXXXIII, [1818] N.Y. Laws 306; see 2 Lincoln 529.
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Prior to 1821, the district attorneys of the state were appointed in the
same manner as the attorney general and their predecessor assistant
attorneys general, that is, by the governor with the advice and con-
sent of the Council of Appointment.17 In 1821 that method was abolished
by the new constitution, which mandated that district attorneys be ap-
pointed by the county courts,18 a method of selection essentially preserved
until 1846 when the new state constitution provided for the popular elec-
tion of district attorneys within their districts."9
B. Relationship with the Office of Governor
Another perspective for examining the history of the offices of attorney
general and district attorney is gained through an analysis of the rela-
tionship between these offices and that of governor. Before the estab-
lishment of constitutional government in New York, the attorney
general was under the direct control of the colonial governor or the
monarch of the nation ruling the colony. The governor's control over
the office was not significantly altered either by the first constitution in
1777 or by the 1796 creation of the office of assistant attorney general.20
Similarly, the statute which created the office of district attorney in
1801 expressly directed that the attorney general could be required to
conduct prosecutions in any county by "the person administering the
government of this state, or any judge of the supreme court by writing
under his hand."'" The district attorney, until the amendment of this
statute in 1827,22 was required to assist the attorney general in such
prosecutions in whatever way the latter deemed desirable. 3 While the
practice of appointing special attorneys general to prosecute important
17. N.Y. Const. art. XXIII (1777).
18. Id. art. IV, § 9 (1821).
19. Id. art. X, § 1 (1846). The only real change from 1846 until the present was an
1894 constitutional provision that district attorneys in New York and Kings Counties were
to be elected every two or four years, instead of every three years. Id. art. 13, § 13(a) (1894).
20. See Law of Feb. 12, 1796, ch. VIII, [1796] N.Y. Laws 265.
21. Law of Apr. 4, 1801, ch. CXLVI, [1801] N.Y. Laws 461, 462.
22. Law of Mar. 6, 1827, ch. VIII, [1827] N.Y. Laws 49. The purpose of the 1827
amendment is unclear, although one could speculate that the 1821 change in the state
constitution, whereby district attorneys were appointed by county courts, made those offices
independent of the attorney general and no longer subject to his control. Yet, as late as
1826, the governor continued to find it necessary in extraordinary cases for the attorney
general to employ counsel to assist the local district attorneys. See Letter from Governor
Clinton to State Assembly in State of New York, 3 Messages from the Governors 145
(Lincoln ed. 1909).
23. Law of Apr. 4, 1801, ch. CXLVI, (1801] N.Y. Laws 461.
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cases continued throughout the nineteenth century,- 4 there is little indica-
tion as to the exclusive nature of their function.
2
In 1894, because of doubts expressed by Governor Flower as to the
legality of appearances by the attorney general before a local grand
jury,26 the Executive Law was amended to authorize such appearancesY1
The changes in the method of selection of district attorneys mandated
by each successive change of the state constitution did nothing to alter
the relationship between the local district attorneys and the state at-
torney general. Despite the doubts of Governor Flower, the power of the
governor to order the attorney general to step in and prosecute at the
local level has continued unaltered to the present day.m It should be
noted that, at each stage in the evolution on the office of district attorney,
the duties of the office have remained basically the same."'
The significance of this history has been variously appraised. The
substance of most judicial analyses, however, is basically that, while
the prosecutorial functions of the office of attorney general have been in
large part transferred to the office of the district attorney, the latter has
not supplanted the former30
24. In his 1860 message to the Legislature, Governor Morgan discussed the financial
burden on the state of paying the expenses of special attorneys general. He believed that
the power to require the attendance of the attorney general on important occasions should
remain, but that it should be placed under stricter limitations, and financed by the counties.
State of New York, S Messages from the Governors 169 (Lincoln ed. 1909).
In an 1874 amendment to an appropriations bill, the Legislature precluded further pay-
ment for special attorneys general whose assistance was requested by the local district
attorney, Law of May 5, 1874, ch. CCCXXII, [1874] N.Y. Laws 386-87, but placed no
limitations on the exercise of the governor's power to require the attorney generals attendance.
25. In precluding further state payment for special attorneys general in 1874, the
Legislature spoke of the "assistance" of attorneys general at the request of local district
attorneys, thereby referring to a situation not specifically provided for in the 1827 statute
governing special designations. See note 22 supra.
26. See 1893 Public Papers of Governor Flower 438-39. The Governor's doubts were
apparently fostered by his reluctance to supersede a local district attorney in what amounted
to a political controversy. See 1894 Public Papers of Governor Flower 65.
27. Law of Feb. 28, 1894, ch. LXVIII, [1894] N.Y. Laws 162.
28. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(2) (McKinney 1972).
29. The language of the statute has been changed from time to time, however, to
accommodate changes in the state courts. See N.Y. County Law § 700 (McKinney 1972).
30. See In re Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 257-60, 21 N.YS.2d 270, 274-76
(2d Dep't 1940); Bennett v. Merritt, 173 Mrsc. 355, 18 N.Y.S2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1940), afl'd,
261 App. Div. 824, 25 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 286 N.Y. 647, 36 N.E.2d 690 (1941)
("[tihe authority of the Governor to compel the Attorney-General to act does not negative
the latter's authority, if any, to act voluntarily." Id. at 359, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 151); People v.
Brennan, 69 Misc. 548, 127 N.Y.S. 958 (Kings County Ct. 1910); People v. Kramer, 33
Misc. 209, 68 N.Y.S. 383 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1900). See also People v. Tru-Sport PubL Co, 160
Misc. 628, 636-39, 291 N.Y.S. 449, 458-61 (Sup. Ct. 1936). Contra, People v. Dorsey, 176
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On the other hand, it could be argued that the Constitution of 1846
mandated that criminal prosecutions be handled on a purely local basis.
This however, is not the case, since it was only the method of selection
of district attorneys, and not the functions of the office or the relation-
ship it bore to other offices within the state's system, that was changed
by the 1846 Constitution.31
III. THE POWER OF SUPERSE DR
A. Its Use in the Past
Historically, the frequency and scope of a governor's use of the power
of superseder has been dependent upon the nature of the problem, as well
as his view of the nature of executive power and its relation to the needs of
the local community as it affected the state at large. One constant pattern
has been a fairly general reluctance to issue an executive order of super-
seder where party or local politics was involved. The power of superseder
has been used rarely, and such is its design.
Prior to 1893 there was apparently no actual dispute over the gover-
nor's power to supersede a district attorney. In that year a group of
citizens requested that a special deputy attorney general be appointed
to investigate alleged election crimes committed in the town of Gravesend
by the Chief of Police. 2 At this time the applicable provision of the
Executive Law provided that the attorney general "[w] henever required
by the governor or a justice of the supreme court, attend the courts of
oyer and terminer for the purpose of managing and conducting a crimi-
nal action or proceeding therein."8  The Kings County District Attorney
opined that a special prosecutor would not be authorized to appear be-
fore the grand jury. He therefore offered to appoint one or more honest
lawyers named by Governor Flower as assistant district attorneys, in
order to relieve the Governor of any embarrassment in designating per-
sons who were unable to make a grand jury appearance. 4 Governor
Flower accepted this proposal, and thereby obviated any potential legal
problems of a grand jury appearance by a special deputy attorney gen-
eral 85 The Governor said that his "anxiety to avoid any miscarriage of
Misc. 932, 29 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Queens County Ct. 1941). "[Tlhe conclusion is inevitable that
the powers of the Attorney-General are only those which are granted by our State Constitu-
tion and by enactments of our Legislature." Id. at 938, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
31. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
32. 1893 Public Papers of Governor Flower 429, 431.
33. Law of May 18, 1892, ch. DCLXXXIII, art. V, § 2 § 52(2), (1892] N.Y. Laws 1691,
1697.
34. 1893 Public Papers of Governor Flower 432.
35. Id. at 438.
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justice was so great that [he] did not wish to take the risk of a quashing
of an indictment through a technicality."3
It would appear, however, that the real concern of Governor Flower
stemmed from his reservations about exercising the power of superseder.
These reservations were revealed in a memorandum on the occasion of
the signing of the 1894 bill 37 which authorized a special deputy attorney
general to appear before a grand jury and precluded the district attorney
from prosecuting a matter in which his authority had been superseded.
The Governor wrote:
This bill confers such sweeping and exclusive power upon the Executive that I
hesitated to affix my signature to it, and have only concluded to do so upon the re-
flection that the measure is an improvement in certain respects upon the existing law
relating to the same subject....
The law, in its present shape, is designed for extraordinary emergencies and should
not be exercised except under peculiar circumstances, or upon the request of the dis-
trict attorney himself, as was the case in the Kings county election prosecutions. The
district attorney is a constitutional officer. He is charged with the prosecution of all
penal offenders. If he does not discharge his duties properly he may be removed by
the Governor, after being given an opportunity to answer the charges made against
him. This power of removal is a wise one, and ought, in itself, to be a sufficient
safeguard.., and the one most in harmony with the spirit of our institutions and
our laws.
Instances occasionally happen, however, where there is no evasion or neglect of
duty on the part of the district attorney, no maladministration of office, but where, by
reason of personal or local complications, the interests of a thorough and impartial
prosecution demand that the Attorney-General should supersede the district attorney.
Such cases the bill under consideration -would provide for. But they are rare, and
resort to this statute, therefore, ought to be equally rare.3s
Governor Flower's conservatism on the issue of superseder was not
shared by his successors. In 1889, Governor Theodore Roosevelt signed
into law an amendment of the Executive Law, which authorized the at-
torney general, when requested by the governor, to investigate whether
crimes relating to the elective franchise were being faithfully prosecuted.
The attorney general in his discretion, or at the order of the governor,
could designate a deputy to prosecute all such crimes. In 1900, Governor
Roosevelt ordered the attorney general to investigate and prosecute all
persons who violated certain provisions of the Penal Law relating to the
elective franchise, 39 and removed the New York County District Attorney
36. Id. at 439.
37. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
38. 1894 Public Papers of Governor Flower 65.
39. 1900 Public Papers of Governor Roosevelt 83. Governor Roosevelt's papers contain no
reference to the 1899 law, Law of Apr. 12, 1899, ch. CCCII, [1899J N.Y. Laws 655, specifically
authorizing the attorney general to investigate and prosecute crimes against the elective
franchise. This provision related only to "metropolitan election districts," which vee con-
stituted in the counties of New York, Kings, Queens, Richmond and Westchester. See Law of
1973]
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from office.4" Between 1910 and 1928, Governors Hughes, 41 Dix,42 Whit-
man4a and Smith" superseded local district attorneys on more than twenty
occasions; only once was there refusal to supersede.4 The orders usually
related to specific crimes," crimes committed by specific persons,47 or
the prosecution of specific indictments.48
In 1928, Governor Smith issued a superseder order relating to all
corrupt acts by public officers in Queens County and persons connected
with such officers.49 The order, however, was silent as to crimes com-
mitted after the date of the order. During Franklin Roosevelt's tenure in
office no occasion arose which made it necessary to issue as broad an
order as the 1928 superseder of Governor Smith, but the specific super-
seders continued.5° Governor Roosevelt also had occasion to suggest to
a district attorney that certain charges be resubmitted to the grand jury. 1
When the district attorney requested the Governor to order a special
deputy attorney general to be associated with the district attorney, the
Governor refused the request with the observation:
I regret that I cannot comply with your request that I direct the Attorney-General
to associate himself with you in the prosecution of these cases. In order to have the
Attorney-General prosecute in matters of this kind, the ordinary and legal procedure
is to supersede the District Attorney for that purpose.
52
July 16, 1898, ch. DCLXXVI, [1898] N.Y. Laws 1612. The attorney general could appoint a
special deputy to take charge of such prosecutions in the appropriate court, or could request
the governor to convene an extraordinary term of the supreme court. Law of Apr. 12, 1899,
h. CCCII, [1899] N.Y. Laws 655. If the latter course of action were undertaken, the law
dearly provided for superseder of the affected district attorney. Id. If no extraordinary term
were convened, the law was unclear whether the district attorney was superseded.
In 1916, the law was amended to provide that the jurisdiction conferred on the attorney
general in the 1899 provision was concurrent with that of the county district attorney, but
exclusive jurisdiction after a particular offense was to belong to the officer who first asserted
it, unless the governor divested that officer of jurisdiction. Law of May 1, 1916, h. CCCLIX,
[1916] N.Y. Laws 966.
40. Matter of Gardiner, 1900 Public Papers of Governor Roosevelt 200.
41. 1910 Public Papers of Governor Hughes 282-88.
42. 1911 Public Papers of Governor Dix 477; 1912 Public Papers of Governor Dlx 306.
43. 1915 Public Papers of Governor Whitman 336-39; 1917 Public Papers of Governor
Whitman 418, 420-21, 423-24.
44. 1923 Public Papers of Governor Smith 358; 1926 Public Papers of Governor Smith
503; 1927 Public Papers of Governor Smith 221, 249.
45. See 1912 Public Papers of Governor Dix 317, 322. Governor Dix refused to honor a
request that special counsel be appointed to supersede a district attorney who lacked
experience.
46. See, e.g., 1917 Public Papers of Governor Whitman 421.
47. See, e.g., 1915 Public Papers of Governor Whitman 376.
48. See, e.g., 1926 Public Papers of Governor Smith 503.
49. 1928 Public Papers of Governor Smith 266.
50. See 1931 Public Papers of Governor Roosevelt 396, 397, 399.
51. Id. at 499.
52. Id. at 501.
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In 1934 Governor Lehman observed that the power to supersede "is
not exercised unless it appears that the district attorney has failed to
discharge the duties of his office or is otherwise precluded or hampered
in doing so."-" Thus, when in 1935 the New York County Grand Jury
requested the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and
prosecute organized crime and vice, the Governor chose not to exercise
his power of superseder. Instead, he requested the New York District
Attorney to appoint an assistant district attorney, to be designated by the
Governor. Governor Lehman stated that "[i]n all fairness to you [Dis-
trict Attorney Copeland] ... from no source have I received criticism
that you have failed to co-operate with the police department of the city
of New York, or to present to grand juries all evidence submitted or
available to you.""s The Governor said he found it necessary to have a
special prosecutor appointed because he strongly believed
that much will be gained by the designation of a special prosecutor of energy, ability,
and of complete independence,-one in whom the people will have full confidence.
Such a prosecutor would be in a position to give his full time to this vital investi-
gation. Such a prosecutor would be able to devote himself to this special task in a
manner that is not possible for any district attorney who is burdened with the tre-
mendous mass of regular law enforcement functions.5
The request by the Governor for appointment of a special prosecutor as
an assistant district attorney was allegedly based upon his view that the
power of superseder would have required a reasonably definite and
limited order."8 The district attorney subsequently complied with the
request to appoint Thomas E. Dewey.
In 1938, Governor Lehman apparently no longer held the same view
of the limited nature of superseder. In that year he ordered superseder
of prosecution for both past and prospective criminal conduct involving
the administration of criminal justice in Kings County. 7 This order had
no expiration date and was subsequently read by the appellate division
to expire at the conclusion of the incumbent district attorney's term in
office.5" Governor Lehman was also faced with situations calling for
narrower orders of superseder.59 However, on one occasion, after issuing
an order superseding a district attorney for crimes in connection with
53. 1934 Publc Papers of Governor Lehman 452.
54. 1935 Public Papers of Governor Lehman 681, 682.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 1938 Public Papers of Governor Lehman 301; see also 1942 Public Papers of Governor
Lehman 403.
58. In re Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 259, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270, 276 (2d Dep't
1940).
59. 1933 Public Papers of Governor Lehman 399; 1936 Public Papers of Governor
Lehman 599.
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the death of a named individual," he subsequently broadened the order
to include crimes connected to the special prosecutor's investigation
regardless of when they occurred.6' On another occasion, Governor
Lehman refused to supersede the Bronx County District Attorney merely
because of the latter's "close political and personal associations" with the
subject of the grand jury investigation.2
Governor Dewey twice rejected requests for orders of superseder,'
but on the several occasions when he did grant such requests, it was with
the broad construction of the scope of the superseder power that had
marked the final years of Governor Lehman's administration. 4 The
scope of such grants of superseder depended on whether they were
directed at a specific crime, person, or activity, but in each grant there
was authority to investigate and prosecute crimes committed both before
and after the date of the executive order. Governor Dewey's view of the
significance of the superseder power was expressed by his counsel, Charles
Breitel, who explained on behalf of the Governor that the "action displac-
ing a local official, particularly an elected one, by a state representative
is not to be resorted to unless there is compelling evidence that the exist-
ing agencies are not performing or are incapable of performing their
proper functions." 5
Although Governor Harriman extended the duration of one executive
order issued by Governor Dewey,66 and issued one very broad order of his
own, 7 his philosophy of superseder was considerably different from that
of his two immediate predecessors. Governor Harriman theorized that a
local district attorney should be superseded only when shown to be
actually incompetent or negligent.6 8 For example, on one occasion he
refused a request by a group of Republican legislators to appoint a
state-wide special prosecutor, observing that such an order would amount
to superseding the district attorneys in all sixty-two counties of the state
without a sufficient basis either in New York County or in any other
county. 9
60. 1935 Public Papers of Governor Lehman 418.
61. 1937 Public Papers of Governor Lehman 503.
62. 1942 Public Papers of Governor Lehman 417.
63. 1945 Public Papers of Governor Dewey 369; 1946 Public Papers of Governor Dewey
423.
64. 1943 Public Papers of Governor Dewey 271-77; 1944 Public Papers of Governor
Dewey 355; 1949 Public Papers of Governor Dewey 438-44; 1952 Public Papers of Governor
Dewey 456.
65. 1945 Public Papers of Governor Dewey 369.
66. 1955 Public Papers of Governor Harriman 414.
67. 1957 Public Papers of Governor Harriman 692.
68. Id. at 1140.
69. Id. at 1139.
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Governor Rockefeller issued a narrow order of superseder late in his
first term in office,7 0 and another in 1969 pursuant to a request by the
District Attorney of Kings County.71 In 196572 and 196971 the Governor
issued considerably broader orders, followed by a broad order in 1971
involving the prosecution of crimes arising from the uprising at Attica
State Prison,74 and the one under scrutiny in this article.
B. Possible Limitations
1. Home Rule
One arguable limitation on the governor's right to appoint a special
state prosecutor is the constitutional concept of home rule,75 a principle
which was succinctly explained by the New York Court of Appeals in
People ex rel. Metropolitan Street Railway v. State Board of Tax Commis-
sioners:76
Local functions, however, cannot be transferred to a state officer. The legislature has
the power to regulate, increase or diminish the duties of the local officer, but it has
been steadfastly held that this power is subject to the limitation that no essential
or exclusive function belonging to the office can be transferred to an officer appointed
by central authority.7 7
From the outset, it should be borne in mind that nowhere in the home
rule provision of the state constitution is there a guarantee of local con-
trol over criminal prosecution of state criminal offenses. Illustrative of
this retention of power in the state is the fact that the City of New York
is precluded by article 13, section 13 (c) of the state constitution from
abolishing the county offices of district attorney, judge or county clerk,
although it is authorized to abolish any other county office. The reason
for this provision lies in the history of these offices and the state function
which they serve.78
70. 1961 Public Papers of Governor Rockefeller 779.
71. 1969 Public Papers of Governor Rockefeller 864.
72. 1965 Public Papers of Governor Rockefeller 795.
73. 1969 Public Papers of Governor Rockefeller 859, 866.
74. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at 1, col 6.
75. See N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1.
76. 174 N.Y. 417, 67 N.E. 69 (1903), aff'd, 199 U.S. 1 (1905). This case concerned the
right of New York State to assess the value of franchises for purposes of taxing them. In
upholding the state's right to assess, the Court of Appeals ruled that such assessment was not
a local function in light of the unique nature of valuating franchise rights, a process which
had never been undertaken by local authorities.
77. Id. at 434-35, 67 N.E. at 72.
78. It should be noted, however, that the term "state official" appears to be a key word,
"impl[ying] variables depending upon the particular problem for which It is used." Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.). Compare Fisher v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 60, 176 N.E2d 72, 217 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1961) (state is not responsible for the tortious acts
1973]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
In Metropolitan Railway, a case upholding the right of the state to
assess the value of franchise rights as a preliminary to taxing them, the
court examined the pre-1777 history of assessors and found that valuat-
ing franchises "is no part of local self-government as known to his-
tory . . . ." This historical approach to home rule would warrant a
similar conclusion when applied to the office of district attorney, which,
as previously indicated, did not exist before the adoption of the first
state constitution. Indeed, the office of district attorney, as we have come
to know it, did not exist any earlier than 1821, and since 1796 the
attorney general has been obliged by statute to prosecute criminal cases
upon request of the governor.
An examination of the home rule question from a modern perspective
likewise mandates the conclusion that the office of district attorney is a
creature of the state. Current constitutional and statutory provisions
describe district attorneys in terms not significantly different from those
which have defined their office at all points in the history of the state.
In addition, the traditional relationship between the office of the governor
and the office of the attorney general has been preserved in section 63
of the Executive Law. Under this section the governor may require the
attorney general to prosecute specific matters in the name of the state,"0
and it is axiomatic that the exercise of this power may result in an intru-
sion upon the office of the district attorney. This intrusion is neither
unusual nor improper when viewed from a historical perspective.8'
In further support of this conclusion, it must be noted that section
2(b) (2) of article nine of the state constitution is dispositive of any
argument that section 63(2) of the Executive Law is an unconstitu-
tional intrusion upon the power of local government to act in matters
that concern the property, affairs or government of the local entity.
Assuming arguendo that the power of superseder does relate to the affairs
or government of a local entity,"' the constitution nevertheless authorizes
of an assistant district attorney since he is a local, rather than state, official), with Splelman
Motor Sales v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (district attorney is state officer for purposes of
enjoining the enforcement of unconstitutional state statute) and Ritter v. State, 283 App. Dlv.
833, 122 N.Y.S.2d 334 (3d Dep't 1953) (indicating that district attorney is a state officer for
purposes of prosecuting criminal charges). See also Zimmerman v. City of New York, 52 Misc.
2d 797, 276 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. La Plante, 207 Misc. 546, 137 N.Y.S.2d
893 (Franklin County Ct. 1955); McDonald v. Goldstein, 191 Misc. 863, 83 N.Y.S.2d 620
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd 273 App. Div. 649, 79 N.Y.S.2d 690 (2d Dep't 1948).
79. 174 N.Y. at 442, 67 N.E. at 75.
80. N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(2) (McKinney 1972).
81. See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
82. It is doubtful whether § 63(2) of the Executive Law does relate to the affairs of local
governments. See Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929); City of New York v.
Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836 (1929).
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intervention by legislative action if it is undertaken as a matter of
"general law,"8s3 defined in the constitution as "law which in terms and
in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly
included within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages. 8s4 On its face,
the superseder provision in the Executive Law is general in nature, and
thus represents a valid exercise of the judicial function, even though in
practice it may relate, in some measure, to local matters. It should also
be noted, by way of emphasis, that the superseder provision is not in
violation of the bill of rights of local governments, 8 nothing in which
guarantees localities the right to have Penal Law violations prosecuted
by local district attorneys.
Judicial interpretations of the home rule guarantees in the state con-
stitution support the conclusion that these provisions do not encompass
subjects of primarily state concern.88 Thus, while the Governor's order
requiring superseder is authorized by a general legislative grant of power
to the executive, it would appear that the order could be sustained on
the additional ground that it is based upon a legitimate state concern.
It seems clear that the fair and proper administration of the state criminal
justice system as it affects approximately eight million New York City
residents, as well as those who conduct business there, is a matter for
state attention, as is the apparent bribery of police officers by persons
involved in narcotics traffic.87 The latter problem indeed has state and
even national ramifications, since New York City is thought to be a
major import and distribution center for hard drugs. Similar concerns
are posed by New York City's status as the nation and state's most
important business center. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the Governor's
order does not have as its basis a legitimate state concern.
2. Nonuse of the Attorney General's Prosecutorial Power
Before discussing the relationship between superseder and removal,
another potential argument against the appropriateness of superseder
should be considered. It may be that the infrequent use of superseder, as
well as modern development of the district attorney as the principal, if
not sole, executor of the prosecutorial function, has rendered the attorney
general legally impotent to exercise such power. Research discloses that
only one court has considered this argument, in the context of a motion
83. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).
84. Id. § 3(d).
85. See id. §§ 1-10.
86. See, e.g., cases cited note 82 supra. See generally Hyman, Home Rule in New York
1941-1965 Retrospect and Prospect, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 335, 343-45 (1965).
87. See Commission Report 13-16.
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to set aside an indictment because an assistant attorney general, pursuant
to an order of superseder, was present during a grand jury proceeding
although he was not authorized by statute to be present.8 s In denying
the motion the court found that the common law right of the attorney
general to appear before a grand jury continued to exist despite the ab-
sence of statutory authorization for such an appearance:
The cycle of problem[s] that confronts the administration of our criminal law has
turned to the point where the need of a renewal of the use of the Attorney-General's
common-law power may be said to be oft times apparent. This is illustrated by the
charges contained in these indictments. Criminal acts and organizations no longer
have a localized aspect and such operations, more than ever before, transcend re-
stricted fields in their mutiny against the law. Geographical bounds no longer bar the
way to the criminal as they were wont to do in the nineteenth century, and cases are
easily envisioned where a district attorney and the grand jury may sorely need such
assistance in the interest of public justice. The nonuser of those powers during the
past century has not, in my opinion, destroyed them.... Custom and practice has
doubtless made the [District Attorney's] duty paramount and accorded precedence in
performance. Thus this power of the Attorney-General was rendered dormant for
want of employment. Later enactments rearranged precedence when positive duty
was assigned, coupled to the old power, and thereby the latter was expressly renewed
for special causes. But through all of this transition, it is my opinion, the power itself
was not destroyed though rendered latent. Therefore, in the cases here presented It
seems to me that it was lawfully renewed and quickened by the action of the district
attorney and the grand jury.89
3. Removal versus Superseder
Another possible criticism of Governor Rockefeller's superseder order
for New York City is that it divests the five district attorneys of the
prerogatives of office without the benefits of notice and a hearing. The
resolution of this problem turns on an understanding of the difference
between superseder and removal. The relationship between these two
powers has never been the subject of judicial scrutiny in this state.
The state constitution specifically grants power to the Governor to re-
move a district attorney from office,10 but only after notice and a hear-
88. People v. Tru-Sport Publ. Co., 160 Misc. 628, 291 N.Y.S. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1936). For a
discussion of the procedure for challenging an order requiring superseder, see text accompany-
ing notes 130-70 infra.
89. 160 Misc. at 639, 291 N.Y.S. at 461; see In re Cranford Constr. Co., 174 Misc. 154,
160, 20 N.Y.S.2d, 865, 871 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("The executive order, however, does not create
power to prosecute. It is the occasion for its exercise.")
90. The state constitution authorizes two types of removal. "The governor may remove
any elective ... district attorney ... but before so doing be shall give to such officer a copy
of the charges against him and an opportunity of being heard in his defense." N.Y. Const.
art. XIII, § 13(a). This provision gives the governor discretion to determine when and if he
must institute removal proceedings, and is to be contrasted with article XIII, § 13(b) of the
constitution, which mandates removal by the governor of a district attorney who falls to
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ing.1 Since the lineage of the Executive Law provision authorizing super-
seder can be traced to 1796, there is nothing to indicate that the removal
provision of the state constitution was designed to replace the power of
superseder. On its face, the limited superseder provision in the Executive
Law does not appear to authorize what would amount to a removal with-
out benefit of notice or hearing,92 and appears distinct from removal in
several ways. First, removal of a district attorney implies complete
divestiture of the duties and prerogatives, as well as compulsory for-
feiture, of the office. Superseder, however, merely divests jurisdiction
over certain specified offenses dealing with a specific problem. Second,
the superseder order usually directs the district attorney to assist the
deputy attorney general, thereby changing his function with respect to a
limited class of cases but in no way removing him from office. Finally,
removal implies dereliction of duty while superseder is based upon in-
ability to perform a given function.
In concept, superseder is designed to provide an orderly and predictable
vehicle to enable the Governor to fulfill his constitutional duty to "take
care that the laws are faithfully executed."93 The decision of whether to
issue an order of superseder or merely to require an investigation is one
which is left solely to the discretion of the Governor, limited only by the
constitutional requirement that there be a "reasonable relationship be-
tween the action taken... and ... the executive function"' to assure
prosecute a person holding office under state law who accepts a bribe to perform, or not to
perform, an official function. Removal is similarly mandated by failure to prosecute an in-
dividual who has offered such a bribe.
91. Id. § 13(a)&(b).
92. See Exec. Law § 63(2) (McKinney 1972). uOf couse, by an executive order calling
upon the Attorney-General to enter a county the office of district attorney could not be
stripped of all its power and the Attorney-General's office made perpetually the prosecuting
office of a county." In re Cranford Material Corp., 174 Misc. 154, 160, 20 N.YS.2d 865, 871
(Sup. Ct. 1940).
93. N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 3. See In re Cranford Material Corp., 174 Mrsc. 1541 20 N.Y.S.2d
865 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
94. Matter of DiBrizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 216, 101 N.E.2d 464, 469 (1951). Interestingly
enough, while the Court of Appeals indicated that there was a standard by which to deter-
mine the validity of an order under N.Y. Executive Law § 63(3), it would appear that if the
Governor were to give adequate notice and a hearing to a district attorney, and remove him
pursuant to N.Y. Const. art. XIII, § 13 (a), the judiciary would be precluded from reviewing
that removal. In re Guden, 171 N.Y. 529, 64 N.E. 451 (1902). See also Donnelly v. Roosevelt,
144 M Isc. 687, 259 N.Y.S. 356 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Although In re Guden was decided in 1932,
and has never been overruled, there is some doubt as to its continuing validity, at least in
situations where a district attorney is removed for exercising rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 US. 593 (1972). Whether the
judiciary may prohibit removal of a district attorney absent a determination based upon
substantial evidence seems to be an open question, the answer to which depends on the con-
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that the laws are faithfully executed. This standard is derived from Matter
of Di Brizzi, 5 a New York Court of Appeals case upholding the legality
and constitutionality of a governor's order requiring an investigation
into the relationship between organized crime and government. While it
may be argued that Di Brizzi dealt only with investigations, it is hard to
understand why a different standard should be applied to superseder
since the investigation of criminal activity is as much a function of the
district attorney as the prosecution of crimes."
It is doubtful whether the Governor's discretion to exercise his execu-
tive power is subject to judicial review. 97 Since it seems clear that the
power to issue superseder orders does meet the requirement of having
a reasonable relation to the executive function, traditional principles of
judicial review would seem to preclude a challenge to the Governor's
order requiring superseder unless there is no basis for his conclusion. As
the New York Court of Appeals has observed in the setting of an admin-
istrative law case:
Where there is conflict in the testimony produced before the Board, where reasonable
men might differ as to whether the testimony of one witness should be accepted or
the testimony of another witness be rejected, where from the evidence either of two
conflicting inferences may be drawn, the duty of weighing the evidence and making the
choice rests solely upon the Board. The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject
the choice made by the Board where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice
exists.
98
tinuing validity of In re Guden. Compare Long Island College Hosp. v. Catherwood, 23
N.Y.2d 20, 241 N.E.2d 892, 294 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1968), with Guardian Life Ins. Co. v.
Bohlinger, 308 N.Y. 174, 124 N.E.2d 110 (1954). See also Ludecke v. Watklns, 335 U.S. 160
(1948); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
When a district attorney is removed for failure to prosecute certain charges of bribery, It is
possible that such removal will be reviewable in the courts for purposes of determining
whether there was a sufficient and factual record upon which to predicate the removal. See
People ex rel. Munday v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 72 N.Y. 445 (1878). The procedure to be
followed by the governor for removal under N.Y. Const. art. XIII, § 13(a) or (b) s set
fourth in N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 34 (McKinney 1952).
95. 303 N.Y. 206, 101 N.E.2d 464 (1951).
96. Superseder has been upheld in situations involving improprieties of state police, People
v. Hopkins, 182 Misc. 313, 47 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1944), and corrupt practices in the
enforcement of law by public servants in a given county, including the office of district
attorney, In re Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270 (2d Dep't 1940).
See also Bennett v. Merritt, 173 Misc. 355, 18 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd 261 App.
Div. 824, 25 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 286 N.Y. 647, 36 N.E.2d 690 (1941).
97. See In re Guden, 171 N.Y. 529, 64 N.E. 451 (1902). See also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335
U.S. 160, 165 (1948); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). See generally 4 K.
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 28.06, 28.07 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
98. Stork Rest. Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 267, 26 N.E.2d 247, 252 (1940). See gener-
ally Davis § 29.03.
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The evidence before the Knapp Commission, on which Governor Rocke-
feller relied in deciding to require superseder, is perhaps subject to many
different inferences, conclusions and recommendations, but to suggest
that it does not support the Governor's action is untenable. Any broader
review by the judiciary would require that the judiciary, and not the
Governor, decide when to require superseder, a result not intended by
the state constitution or Executive Law, nor coveted by the judiciary.1P
Although no court has ever required a governor to justify the issuance
of an executive order requiring superseder, there is respectable authority
that such an order may be no broader than the mischief which caused
it to be issued.100 To determine whether the most recent order of super-
seder is overbroad, it is necessary to examine the Summary and Principal
Recommendations of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police
Corruption,0 1 commonly referred to as the Knapp Commission.
IV. TME KNAmP CoMInssION SUMMARY
A. The Evidence
After two years of investigation, the Knapp Commission reported that,
while an appreciable number of New York City police do not engage in
any corrupt activities,0 2 corruption in the Police Department was wide-
spread.'0 3 Although the scope of the Commission's mandate for investiga-
tion was limited to allegations of police corruption, the Summary noted
that police do not have a "monopoly on corruption."'", The Commission
found that "in every area where police corruption exists it is paralleled
by corruption in other agencies of government, in industry and labor,
and in the professions."'0 5
99. See cases cited note 97 supra. To the extent that a court is prepared to say that the
order requiring superseder is in fact a removal, notice and a hearing is required, N.Y. Coast.
art. XI § 13(a)&(b), followed, perhaps, by judicial review. See also note 94 supra.
100. See, e.g., In re Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 259, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270, 276
(2d Dep't 1940).
101. Commission Report, supra note 4, at 1-34. The "Summary and Principal Recom-
mendations" of the Commission was issued on August 3, 1972, and incorporated as part of
the Commission's final report, released on December 26, 1972, more than three months after
the issuance of Governor Rockefeller's esecutive order.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id. Less than a month before the appointment of the Commission, the New York
Times charged widespread police corruption and official laxity in dealing with such corruption.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1970, at 1, col 1. Since the issuance of the Commission Summary, serious
charges regarding members of the judiciary have been made in the news media. See, e4g,
Newfield, The Ten Worst Judges in New York City, New York Magazine, Oct. 6, 1972, at 32;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1972, at 1, col. 7. The Newfield article has aroused considerable con-
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The Knapp Commission found that much of the difficulty in combat-
ting police corruption derives from the fact that all of the official agencies
involved in ferreting out corruption must rely upon policemen for their
investigative work. "In the case of the District Attorneys, there is an
additional problem that they work so closely with policemen that the
public tends to look upon them-and indeed they seem to look upon them-
selves--as allies of the Department.'0'0 The citizen wishing to complain
about a policeman knows that the follow-up investigation will be done
by other policemen and "New Yorkers just don't trust policemen to
investigate each other."' 0 7 Considerable evidence of this distrust was
presented to the Knapp Commission:
Many people-sometimes represented by experienced lawyers-brought the Commis-
sion evidence of serious corruption which they said they would not have disclosed to the
police or to a District Attorney or to the City's Department of Investigation. Even
today, complainants who call the Commission and are told that the investigation has
ended often refuse to take down the phone numbers of these agencies. It makes no
difference whether or not this distrust is justified. The harsh reality is that it exists.
This distrust is not confined to members of the public. Many policemen came to us
troversy, and provoked several responses from the bar. See, e.g., N.Y.IJ., Dec. 4, 1972, at 1,
col. 4. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1972, at 27, col. 1 (special prosecutor investigating
twenty justices for possible "favoritism" to organized crimes); N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1972, at
18, col. 1 (State Commission of Investigation investigating cases in which alleged mafia figures
received lenient sentences); N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1972, at 40, col. 3 (Brooklyn District
Attorney investigating disposition of case against alleged mafia member by named supreme
court justice). The Queens County District Attorney's office has been the subject of con.
siderable adverse publicity and charges of corruption. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1972 at
20, col. 4. A federal grand jury was investigating alleged criminal charges against members of
the Queens District Attorney's Office, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1972, at 52, col. 1. In addition, an
assistant district attorney of Queens County has recently been convicted in federal court of
accepting a $15,000 bribe to fix a criminal case. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1973, at 39, col. 3.
The special prosecutor has commenced a grand jury investigation into the activities of the
Queens County District Attorney's Office, resulting in at least one refusal to execute a waiver
of immunity, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 3, as well as the appearance as a witness
of the District Attorney himself before the grand jury. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
Although the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination by these assistant district
attorneys has brought forth a call for their dismissal, such a dismissal would violate the
Constitution. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). However, if an assistant district
attorney, in his capacity as a public servant, should "[refuse] to answer questions specifically,
directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, without being required
to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal
prosecution of himself,... the privilege... would not have been a bar to his dismissal." Id.
at 278 (footnote omitted). The court in Gardner appears to be suggesting that any testimony
at such an inquiry could not be used against the assistant district attorney in a criminal
proceeding. See Uniform Sanitation Men's Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619
(2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972).
106. Commission Report 14 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
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with valuable information which they consented to give us only upon our assurance
that we would not disclose their identities to the Department or to any District
Attorney. 08
The focus of the Commission's investigation was on the police rather than
other constituents of the criminal justice system. Accordingly, the Com-
mission's final report contained very little hard evidence of actual cor-
ruption or non-feasance of judges, prosecutors and other non-police per-
sonnel. Nevertheless, the public's fear of such conduct is a documented
fact, and it is to this widespread notion that the Knapp Commission
addressed its recommendation.
B. The Recommendation
"Any proposal for dealing with corruption must.., provide a place
where policemen as well as the public can come with confidence and
without fear of retaliation.""0 9 The Knapp Commission observed that the
widespread charges of corruption among prosecutors, lawyers and judges,
as well as the police force, mandated the interposition of an office having
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute corruption in the entire criminal
justice process. The prosecutorial function of this new office was, accord-
ing to the Knapp Commission, essential to insure independence of the
agencies which might come under its scrutiny.110 Since corruption
transcends county lines and "District Attorneys' offices are reluctant
to encroach upon each other's jurisdictions, much less investigate each
other's personnel,""' the Commission concluded that city-wide jurisdic-
tion was absolutely necessary.
Given their findings, and the need for a war on corruption, the Knapp
Commission recommended
that the Governor, acting with the Attorney General pursuant to § 63 of the Executive
Law, appoint a Special Deputy Attorney General with jurisdiction in the five counties
of the City and authority to investigate and prosecute all crimes involving corruption
in the criminal process."12
V. THE GoVERNoR's ORDER
It should be emphasized that the impetus for the latest executive order
requiring superseder resulted from a recommendation by a body ap-
pointed by the Mayor of the City of New York without any compulsion
by the Governor of New York State."x3 There is no evidence that even
lo. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 15.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. See id. at 35-36.
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remotely suggests that the Governor exerted pressure, overtly or covertly,
upon the Knapp Commission to request the appointment of a special
deputy attorney general.
While the Knapp Commission Summary did not specifically recommend
that the proposed special deputy attorney general have exclusive jurisdic-
tion," 4 the Governor's executive order does provide for such exclusive
jurisdiction. Apparently, administrative difficulties and potential inter-
ference-intentional or unintentional-with investigations of official cor-
ruption mandated exclusive jurisdiction in a special prosecutor with
absolute discretion to prosecute or investigate a given case or to direct a
district attorney to perform either or both functions.
The Governor's executive order calls for the investigation and prosecu-
tion of corrupt acts connected in any way to the administration of the
criminal justice system in New York City when committed by a public
servant or any other individual whose conduct is in any way related to
the corrupt act of a public servant." 5 The order encompasses such cor-
rupt acts whether they occurred before or after issuance of the order." 0
The executive order's specification of corrupt acts relating to the admin-
istration of law in New York City appears no broader than a 1940 order
upheld by the appellate division, second department, which called for
investigation and prosecution of crimes relating to the enforcement of
law in Kings County."" That the order in the present situation en-
compasses the entire City of New York is justified by the Knapp Com-
mission's findings that the corruption, as well as the public's shaken
confidence in those who administer the criminal laws, was a city-wide
problem with implications crossing county boundaries."18 Criminal justice
114. See id. at 14.
115. Executive Order No. 55(I) (a)&(b). The order also extends to any criminal acts of
interference with the execution of any function authorized by the order. Id. (I) (c).
116. Id. (I)(a)-(c). The "theft" from the New York City Police Department of some
four hundred pounds of narcotics, including eighty-one pounds of heroin Involved In the
"French Connection" case, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 2; id., Dec. 21, 1972, at 1,
col. 3, resulted in a jurisdictional dispute between the special prosecutor and the elected dis-
trict attorneys. See id., Dec. 28, 1972, at 1, col. 7. Failure to adhere to the original executive
order, which clearly vested jurisdiction over such a crime in the special prosecutor, resulted
in an additional executive order specifically precluding the district attorneys from Investigat-
ng the crime. See id., Dec. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
117. In re Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270 (2d Dep't 1940), See
also People v. Dorsey, 176 Misc. 932, 291 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Queens County Ct. 1941). It Is true,
however, that the orders in Turecamo and Dorsey specified the subject matter of the orders
with greater specificity than the order under discussion, and were found to have as their
principal purpose the investigation of the district attorney's office. In re Turecamo Contr. Co.,
260 App. Div. 253, 259, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270, 276 (2d Dep't 1940).
118. Commission Report 15. Governor Rockefeller, in his statement accompanying the
executive order, stated: "I have taken this action in recognition of a fundamental reality:
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corruption cases comprise an extremely low percentage of a prosecutor's
caseload in New York City.119 Although somewhat refined distinctions
must be made, it would seem the local prosecutors have been superseded
in such a very narrow area that any resulting stigmatization of a district
attorney can not be equated with the consequences of removal, and thus
do not mandate notice and a hearing. It should be emphasized in this con-
text that neither the Knapp Commission nor the Governor in his executive
order raised any question of malfeasance on the part of the superseded
district attorneys.
The Governor's superseder order empowers a special deputy attorney
general to prosecute violations of local statutes, where such violations
arise out of, or relate to, the administration of criminal justice in the
City of New York.2 While this provision of the order is dearly autho-
rized by subdivision two of section 63 of the Executive Law, it would
seem that in enforcing the New York City Administrative Code, district
attorneys act not as state officials, but in a purely local capacity.'2'
The justification for superseding a district attorney in these circumstances
might be the fear that prosecution under the Administrative Code would
preclude prosecution for a greater offense under the Penal Law.' -
The purpose of reserving a body of cases for prosecution as higher
crimes would appear to bear a reasonable relationship to the executive
function.
While the executive order specifically states that district attorneys
that under the present circumstances, only an independent agency with city wide authority,
assigned a clear and specific mission and armed with full prosecuting power and independent
investigative capacity, can break through the natural resistance of government agencies to
investigate themselves or their close allies, can overcome the forces of inertia, and can finally
deal a decisive blow to narcotics, crime and corruption in New York City." N.Y. Times,
Sept. 20, 1972 at 28, col. 2.
119. During the judicial year 1969-1970, approximately 17,000 indictments were returned
in New York City, 1971 Judicial Conference Report 314, and non-traffic misdemeanor arraign-
ments numbered about 134,000. Id. at 326. In the course of its investigation, the Knapp
Commission tabulated all corruption cases brought against police officers in recent years in
New York City. See Commission Report 250-51. As the Commission reports: "In the four
and a half years from the beginning of 1968 through the first six months of 1972, the five
prosecutors initiated 136 Supreme Court and Criminal Court proceedings involving 218
defendants in police corruption cases." Id. at 251. Although no similar statistics are available
with respect to cases of official corruption involving non-police personnel, it is reasonable to
assume that the proportion of such cases to all prosecutions initiated in New York City is
also quite low.
120. Executive Order No. 55(I) (a)&(b).
121. It is true, however, that the New York City Administrative Code is authorized only
by virtue of the state constitution. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c)(10); see N.Y. Mun. Home
Rule Law § 10 (1) (ii) (a) (11) (McKinney 1969).
122. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.40 (McKinney 1971).
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are not superseded as to any indictments filed on or before September 19,
1972, the date of the order, 123 it seems clear that the special prosecutor
is authorized to investigate the manner in which a prosecution was con-
ducted, regardless of when the indictment was returned. Indeed, such
investigations, and the potential prosecutions resulting therefrom are two
of the prime purposes of the executive order. 24 Moreover, the special
prosecutor is to be responsible for controlling all investigations of cor-
ruption pertaining to the criminal justice process in New York City,
whether in progress before the date of the Governor's order, or under-
taken after that date. While this may present some problems of coordina-
tion of investigations, the resolution of these difficulties is the respon-
sibility of the special prosecutor under the order, and presumably such
difficulties "can be reduced to a minimum by adherence to the executive
orders."' 25
In keeping with the view of the Knapp Commission that corruption in
the criminal justice system cannot be fought effectively by the local
district attorney's office, the Governor's order has no expiration date.
In effect, this represents an opinion that such corruption is an insti-
tutional defect which cannot be cured by a mere change in personnel.
Such was not the case in In re Turecamo Contracting Co.120 There the
court was concerned with an executive order authorizing the attorney
general or his designee to prosecute and supersede the Kings County
District Attorney for specific crimes, and in addition, to investigate and
prosecute
any and all acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, non-feasance, misconduct or negligence
committed in connection with the enforcement of law in the county of Kings by
public officers, employees and any other person or persons, including the police, the
district attorney of Kings county and any and all members of his staff and employees
of his office, the officer or officers charged with the duty of selecting persons to serve
as grand and petit jurors, the department of correction of the City of New York, the
courts of criminal jurisdiction in Kings county and all judges, officers, attendants,
agents or employees thereof, in violation of any general, local or special law of the
State of New York; and any and all acts which may have been committed or which
may be committed by any person or persons for the purpose of obstructing, hindering,
or interfering with the enforcement of law in the County of Kings or with the actions
or proceedings to be conducted pursuant to this order or the prosecution of any and
all indictments resulting therefrom .... 127
Observing that the attorney general was in part directed to investigate
123. Executive Order No. 55(IV).
124. Id. I(a)-(c).
125. In re Cranford Material Corp., 174 Misc. 154, 161, 20 N.Y.S.2d 865, 872 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
126. 260 App. Div. 253, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270 (2d Dep't 1940).
127. 1938 Public Papers of Governor Lehman 301-02.
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the Kings County District Attorney himself, as well as members of his
office, the court concluded that the order should terminate at the end of
the incumbent district attorney's term in office, thereby ending the at-
torney general's authority to continue any prosecution or investigation
commenced prior to that date. The court found that the executive orders
were extremely broad, "but by reasonable intendment they may be
taken to refer only to matters occurring during the incumbency of the
district attorney holding office at the time of the Governor's mandate."'M
The orders in the instant case are broader than those involved in
Turecamo and apparently a change in personnel will not cure the under-
lying institutional defect. While executive order fifty-five is quite broad,
it would seem that the governor could continually amend the original order
to encompass any specific controversy which may arise. Such additions
would cure the problem (if any) of vagueness, but the judiciary would
nevertheless have to determine whether the governor has authority to
create a new state official. For, in effect, there is now a state prosecutor for
crimes relating to the criminal justice system in New York City. The
wisdom of creating a massive new bureaucracy for this purpose is
certainly questionable. It may well be that the power of superseder was
not intended to bring about such a result, although such result is con-
sistent with Governor Rockefeller's perception of that power.'
VI. RAisING THE ALLEGED IN vALTDITY o THE ExEcuivE
ORmER REQunuNG SUPERSEDER
The method by which the validity of the superseder order may be
raised and decided presents significant questions meriting at least brief
consideration. Since a superseded district attorney would be personally
aggrieved by the Governor's order, he doubtlessly would have standing
to challenge that order,130 probably by an article 78 proceeding in the
nature of prohibition. 3' A defendant indicted as the result of a grand
jury presentation by the special prosecutor's office has standing to move
to dismiss an indictment, 3 ' or to make the traditional motion to vacate
128. 260 App. Div. at 259, 21 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
129. See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
130. See St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E2d 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43
(1963); cf. Donahue v. Cornelius, 17 N.Y.2d 390, 396-97, 218 N.E.2d 285, 287-88, 271 N.Y.S.2d
231, 234-35 (1966); In re Guden, 171 N.Y. 529, 64 N.E. 451 (1902). See also Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
131. N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 78 (McKinney 1972); cf Donahue v. Cornelius, 17 N.Y.2d 390,
218 N.E.2d 285, 271 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1966).
132. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.20. See, e.g., People v. Hopkins, 182 Misc. 313, 47
N.Y.S.2d 222 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1944); People v. Dorsey, 176 Misc. 932, 29 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Queens
County Ct. 1941)
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a subpoena 3 based upon the appearance before the grand jury of an
assistant attorney general acting pursuant to the invalid order of super-
seder.13
4
The language of the recently adopted Criminal Procedure Law, how-
ever, may increase the difficulty of deciding a motion to dismiss an
indictment obtained by the special assistant attorney general. Like its
predecessor, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Criminal Procedure
Law authorizes, where appropriate, the grand jury appearance of an
assistant attorney general. 135 In addition, it sets forth grounds upon
which a motion to dismiss an indictment may be based. 8 '
In the present situation, it would seem that the only traditional basis
for the motion would be an allegation that the grand jury proceeding was
rendered defective 37 by the appearance of an assistant attorney general
pursuant to an invalid order requiring superseder, since such an un-
authorized appearance would be "inappropriate" in terms of the statute. 88
For the motion to succeed, the law requires that the failure to conform
to the law governing grand jury proceedings be such that the integrity
of the grand jury proceeding is impaired and prejudice to the defendant
may result.139 In contrast, the Code of Criminal Procedure required that
133. See, e.g., In re Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App. Div. 253, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270 (2d Dep't
1940) ; In re Cranford Material Corp., 174 Misc. 154, 20 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
134. A defendant ordinarily may not raise a question concerning the validity of an indict-
ment by an article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition, N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 78 (McKinney
1972), unless the trial court is exceeding its jurisdiction and the writ or order sought would
furnish a more effective remedy than an appeal. Compare Kraemer v. Suffolk County Ct., 6
N.Y.2d 363, 160 N.E.2d 633, 189 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1959) (issue of double jeopardy may be raised
by seeking order of prohibition), with Blake v. Hogan, 25 N.Y.2d 747, 250 NX.2d 568, 303
N.Y.S.2d 505 (1969) (issue of denial of speedy trial may not be raised by seeking order of
prohibition). In some situations a question presented may be of such magnitude that utiliza.
tion of prohibition is permissible. See, e.g., Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d
452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971) (whether a trial court could strike
defense of insanity upon defendant's refusal to submit to a court-ordered mental examination
could be raised by prohibition). To the extent that a defendant may argue that the Invalid
superseder order divested the grand jury, as well as the trial court, of jurisdiction, it Is possible
that such a question may fit within Lee v. Erie County Ct. "[1it is far better to prevent the
exercise of an unauthorized power than to be driven to the necessity of correcting the error
after it is committed." Appo v. People, 20 N.Y. 531, 542 (1860). But see People ex rel. Childs
v. Extraordinary Trial Term, 228 N.Y. 463, 127 N.E. 486 (1920) (failure to publish notice
of governor's order as required by law not cognizable by writ of prohibition).
135. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.25(3) (a) (McKinney 1971) (authorizing grand jury
appearance of district attorney) ; id. § 1.20(32) (the term "district attorney" includes, where
appropriate, assistant attorney general).
136. Id. § 210.20.
137. Id. § 210.20(1)(c).
138. See note 135 supra.
139. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.35(5) (McKinney 1971).
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an indictment be set aside when an unauthorized person was present
during the grand jury proceedings140 or when the indictment was "not
found ... to be as prescribed" by the Code of Criminal Procedure."
Although the draftsmen of the Criminal Procedure Law manifested no
intention to change prior law," the new provisions specifically require an
effect on the integrity of the proceedings and potential prejudice to the
accused, while the Code of Criminal Procedure required no showing of
resulting prejudice to the defendant." It would appear that under the
Criminal Procedure Law, there will be considerable difficulty in establish-
ing prejudice. For the purpose of discussing possible challenges to pro-
ceedings resulting from the superseder, it will be assumed, arguendo, that
the executive order of superseder is invalid,144 such invalidity resting on
the concept that persons accused of crimes in, and residents of a given
county are entitled to have their investigations and prosecutions conducted
by elected officials. When that function is usurped by an individual ap-
pointed at the direction of the governor, in violation of state law, then the
public is injured. While not every citizen may have standing to raise the
question, 4 5 an individual criminal defendant is personally aggrieved"4 by
an indictment obtained by an unauthorized appearance of an assistant
attorney general. Although such an appearance would seem to constitute
a legal defect sufficient to have required dismissal of the indictment
under the old Code of Criminal Procedure,1 47 it is unclear exactly how
the defendant has been prejudiced as required under the Criminal Pro-
cedure Law, 4 " unless a per se approach is adopted.
140. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 313(2), Law of June 1, 1881, ch. CDXLII, [1881] N.Y.
Laws 1, vol 11, at 82.
141. Id. § 313(1). In cases decided under these Code of Criminal Procedure provisions,
courts have upheld the validity of indictments and subpoenas obtained by an assistant attorney
general, provided that the assistant attorney general had authority to present evidence to the
particular grand jury returning the indictment. See People v. Hopkins, 182 Misc. 313, 47
N.Y.S.2d 222 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1944) (Convening of special and extraordinary term of Supreme
Court in Dutchess County did not authorize assistant attorney general to obtain indictment in
New York County); People v. Dorsey, 176 Mlisc. 932, 29 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Queens County Ct.
1941) (Superseder in Kings County did not authorize indictment in Queens County).
142. Staff Comment to McKinney's Proprosed N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 110.40, at 187
(1967).
143. Compare People v. Minet, 296 N.Y. 315, 73 N.E.2d 529 (1947), and People v.
Scannell, 36 Misc. 40i 72 N.Y.S. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1901), with People v. La Brecque, 198 rasc.
470, 98 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
144. But see text accompanying notes 113-29 supra.
145. Posner v. Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970, 259 N.E.2d 484, 311 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1970); St.
Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963).
146. See cases cited note 130 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 140-41 supra.
148. See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra.
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The second element which must be satisfied before an indictment may
be dismissed as defective-the impairment of the integrity of the proceed-
ing 4 09-is even more difficult of proof. If the term "integrity" may be
equated with legality, no serious problems arise since such a reading is
consistent with the manifested intention of the legislature that the law
is not being changed. 5 ' Although a more plausible reading might equate
integrity with reliability,'5 ' such a reading is not without difficulties.
While the old Code did not require a finding of impairment of reli-
ability to invalidate particular grand jury proceedings, some decisions
appeared to turn on a determination that an individual's unauthorized
appearance before the grand jury did impair the integrity-reliability
of the process.5 2 The difficulty of this standard is obvious. A defendant
would be hard put to determine and prove whether, given the same
evidence, the superseded district attorney would have presented the
case to the grand jury or whether a grand jury acting under the guidance
of the elected official would have returned an indictment.5 3
An argument that there might have been good reason for the district
attorney to decide against prosecution-for example, because the defen-
dant would have agreed to testify against more important defendants-is
not only virtually impossible to prove, 54 but also assumes that the special
prosecutor's failure to exercise his discretion in the same manner is a
defect impairing the reliability of the grand jury process. This, of course,
is an unwarranted assumption in that a determination of the integrity of
149. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.35(5) (McKinney 1971); see text accompanying note
139 supra.
150. See Staff Comment to McKinney's Proposed N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 110.40, at 187
(1967).
151. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966); cf. Moskowitz v. Marrow,
251 N.Y. 380, 389-90, 167 N.E. 506, 509 (1929).
152. See, e.g., People v. La. Brecque, 198 Misc. 470, 98 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
Other cases invalidating indictments returned by a grand jury before which an assistant
attorney general had made an unauthorized appearance seemed to rest on some form of
jurisdictional defect in the grand jury proceeding. See, e.g., In re Turecamo Contr. Co., 260
App. Div. 253, 21 N.Y.S.2d 270 (2d Dep't 1940); People v. Dorsey, 176 Misc. 932, 29
N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also Bennett v. Merritt, 173 Misc. 355, 18 N.Y.S.2d 146
(Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 824, 25 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 286 N.Y.
647, 36 N.E.2d 690 (1941).
153. The Criminal Procedure Law places upon the defendant "the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion." N.Y. Crim. Proc.
Law § 210.45(7) (McKinney 1971). Thus it is incumbent on the defendant to prove that
the integrity of the grand jury proceeding has been impaired by the appearance of the assistant
district attorney.
154. The difficulty in assessing the various factors going to the integrity of the grand jury
proceeding is illustrative of the impact of the burden of proof on the resolution of substantive
issues. Cf. People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1971).
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the grand jury ordinarily focuses on the actions of the jury itself and the
factors going to the reliability of its decision. An even more difficult
argument for a defendant to advance is that, given the same evidence, a
grand jury acting under the guidance of the district attorney would not
have returned an indictment. This argument seems to impute dishonesty
or incompetency to either the special prosecutor or the district attorney,
an imputation no court should be prepared to make.
Given the difficulty of finding an indictment defective when returned
by a grand jury before which a member of the special prosecutor's office
has appeared, perhaps it would be preferable to read section 210.35(5)
of the Criminal Procedure Law as requiring only "a legal defect which
may result in prejudice" or a "defect that impairs the integrity of the
proceeding," rather than, as is stated in that provision, a defect of such
a nature that it "impairs the integrity [of a grand jury proceeding] and
[from which] prejudice to the defendant may result." Such a reading is
based upon the rationale that once a defect impairs the integrity of the
fact-finding process, the defendant is prejudiced a fortiori, the provision
being disjunctive, rather than conjunctive.ls This analysis is supported
by the distinct possibility that the terms "impairing the integrity of
the proceeding" and "potential prejudice" may well have been intended
to encompass only a situation in which both competent and incompetent
evidence is introduced before the grand jury2le In such a case, the
reliability of the decision to return an indictment is impaired only when,
absent the incompetent evidence, there was insufficient evidence upon
which to return the indictment."5 7 Of course, even a disjunctive reading
requires a showing of either prejudice or lack of integrity which cannot
be established unless the defective order and subsequent grand jury
appearance constituted prejudice per se. Although the showing of preju-
dice requirement is a departure from prior law158 and the legislature
manifested no intent to work such a change,""o the language of the
Criminal Procedure Law is quite clear and must be given effect.lCu
155. Cf. In re Estate of Weil, 280 App. Div. 100, 111 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1st Dep't 1952), affd,
305 N.Y. 635 (1953) ; Long v. Jerzewski, 235 App. Div. 441, 257 N.Y.S. 371 (4th Dep't 1932).
156. For a discussion of what evidence is admissible before a grand jury, see R. Pitlar,
Criminal Practice Under the CPL 237 (1971).
157. See People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1956). But
see People v. Barbour, 152 Misc. 39, 273 N.Y.S. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (standard is whether
incompetent evidence influenced grand jury's decision to return an indictment). See also
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
158. See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 313(1)&(2), Law of June 1, 1881, ch. CDXLI, [1881]
N.Y. Laws, vol. II, at 82; People v. Mlinet, 296 N.Y. 315, 73 N.E.2d 529 (1947).
159. See note 142 supra and accompanying text.
160. Cf. In re Smathers' Will, 309 N.Y. 487, 494, 131 N.E.2d 896, 899 (1956); People v.
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Another possible challenge to indictments obtained by the special
attorney general merits mention. Although the Governor's power to
convene a special and extraordinary term of the supreme court 01 and
to appoint the presiding justice is not open to dispute,1 0 2 it is possible
that, because the order convening such a term in the present situation is
so inextricably intertwined with the order requiring superseder, the
putative invalidity of the latter strips the former of all legality.1'0 An
invalid order convening the special and extraordinary terms a fortiori
renders a grand jury empanelled for that term unlawfully constituted,
requiring dismissal of any indictment it returns-' 4 The vitality of such
an argument is doubtful, however, since the decision to appoint a special
and extraordinary term of the supreme court is in the discretion of the
governor. 16 5
One further provision of the Criminal Procedure Law requires dis-
missal of an indictment when "[t]here exists some other jurisdictional
or legal impediment to conviction of the defendant for the offense
charged,"'0 0 a provision designed to encompass jurisdictional or legal
Dethloff, 283 N.Y. 309, 315, 28 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1940); Allen v. Stevens, 161 N.Y. 122, 145,
55 N.E. 568, 574 (1899).
161. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 27; N.Y. Judiciary Law § 149 (McKinney 1968).
162. See People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Supreme Court, 220 N.Y. 487, 116
N.E. 384 (1917); People v. Gillette, 191 N.Y. 107, 83 N.E. 680 (1908). The unreviewable
nature of the Governor's appointment of the presiding justice at the extraordinary term cer-
tainly calls into question notions of an independent judicial officer who acts as a buffer be-
tween the executive branch of government and the accused. Questions about judicial indepen-
dence are no better illustrated than by the appointment in the instant situation. See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1972, at 51, col. 6 ($100,000 bail set in first bribery indictment against three
police officers obtained by special prosecutor-a break with tradition of low bail for police
officer absent any evidence of potential flight-upon the special prosecutor's expressed desire
to "protect" the defendants from others who have reason to fear that defendants " 'w ill tell
all'"). Neither the court nor the prosecutor mentioned the material witness provisions of
New York Law, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 620.20(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney 1971), which ap-
parently would authorize an order holding material witnesses without bail. See R. Pitler,
Criminal Practice Under the CPL 590 (1971). For another aspect of the bail question, see
People ex rel. Bird v. Behagen, 65 Misc. 2d 733, 320 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct, 1971) (ball
refused after revocation thereof by presiding judge because of co-defendant's flight). Cf.
N.Y. Post, May 14, 1971, at 2, col. 2 (jurors' description of presiding judge's conduct during
trial). See also Schultz, The Anatomy of a Murder Trial-the People v. William Phillips, N.Y.
Tmes, Dec. 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine) at 4, 42.
163. Cf. People ex re]. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 60, 129 N.E.
202, 207 (1920). See also People v. Mancuso, 255 N.Y. 463, 473-74, 175 N.E. 177, 180-81.
(1931).
164. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.35(1) (McKinney 1971).
165. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
166. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.20(1)(h) (McKinney 1971). The only other provision
that could arguably be applicable is § 210.20(1) (i), which authorizes dismissals at the discre-
SUPERSEDING DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
defects not covered by other paragraphs of the applicable sections of the
Criminal Procedure Law.167 Although this section relieves a defendant of
the burden of proving the likelihood of prejudice,'" the only defect
possible in this situation is the allegedly invalid executive order requiring
superseder, because if convocation of the special and extraordinary term
of the supreme court is legal, then the grand jury is legally constituted
and no jurisdictional defect exists.169
The only remaining argument against the validity of indictments
obtained by the deputy attorney general is a potential defendant's right
to be prosecuted by a proper official 70 For this to work as a basis for
dismissal, a court must be prepared to find that a defendant is within
the class of persons to be protected from an order which is invalid per se.
Thus, if the superseder is invalid only because it infringes the personal
right of the district attorney not to be removed from office without notice
of charges and a hearing, there is no legal impediment to the defendant's
conviction.
It should be reemphasized that this discussion on the manner by which
questions involving an invalid order of superseder may be raised is based
upon the questionable assumption that the order is in fact defective.
VII. CONCLUSION
The constitutional history of New York State demonstrates that a
district attorney, despite his local election in the county in which he
serves, is a state executive officer performing a state function and is
therefore subject to the exercise of the governor's executive power. Al-
though the superseder order recently issued by the Governor is quite
broad in superseding local district attorneys for crimes not yet com-
mitted, it is no broader than the mischief it seeks to prevent and is
reasonably related to the constitutional duty of the Governor to assure
that the laws are faithfully executed. The five district attorneys of the
City of New York have been superseded in a narrow, albeit a very sig-
tion of the court. The question presented here, however, appears to be purely one of law-
making authority, and is not an appropriate one for determination by judicial discretion. See
Hogan v. Culkin, 18 N.Y.2d 330, 221 N.E2d 546, 274 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1966).
167. R_ Denzer, Practice Commentary to McKinney's N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.20, at
340.
168. Cf. People v. Minet, 296 N.Y. 315, 73 N.E.2d 529 (1947).
169. While most decisions in this area arise in the context of a motion to dismiss an indict-
ment or vacate a subpoena based upon an unauthorized grand jury appearance, the courts'
discussions are often in terms of a jurisdictional or legal defect apart from the nature of the
appearance. See, e.g., cases cited note 152 supra.
170. "ITihe word 'prosecute' . . . connotes the beginning as well as the carrying on of a
criminal action." People v. Zara, 44 Misc. 2d 698, 701, 255 N.YS.2d 43, 46-47 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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nificant, area of jurisdiction. The Mayor's Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Police Corruption in New York City demonstrated that
city-wide jurisdiction over this narrow area by a special deputy attorney
general was absolutely necessary to return effective, impartial and honest
administration of the criminal system to residents of the nation's most
populous and important city. The integrity of such a criminal justice
system both reflects on the state and affects it as a whole, and is un-
deniably a matter of state concern. The achievement of a just system
is the very purpose for which power of superseder was intended.
Given the revelations in the Knapp Commission Report, it seems clear
that Governor Rockefeller would have been derelict in his constitutional
duty to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed,"11' had he failed
to take action. The best course of action to be pursued was, however, a dif-
ficult problem. Perhaps an order to the State Commission of Investigation
to conduct an inquiry into the administration of criminal justice in New
York City would have sufficed. Yet, whatever the desirability of such an
alternative, how would it have fulfilled the need to motivate individual
citizens to disclose evidence of corruption to local prosecuting agencies?
How could sanctions contained in the Penal Law serve their deterrent
function if there was no real fear of prosecution? If corruption was as
widespread as suggested by the Knapp Commission, would not another
investigation merely restate the problem without bringing about a solution?
For the Governor to have failed to appoint a special prosecutor would
have meant turning his back on an evil that threatened to destroy all
public confidence in the criminal justice system, making administration
of criminal law in New York City impossible. Furthermore, a failure to
act might eventually have resulted in federal intervention similar to the
action undertaken by the United States Attorney's Office in Chicago, a
city probably at least as corrupt as New York, because purely political
considerations there dictate a hands-off policy 72 by the State's Attorney.
Immediately after issuance of the executive order requiring superseder,
there was a threat of a legal proceeding challenging the validity of the
order.1 3 Given the legal principles and history discussed herein, it is
doubtful that such action would have been ultimately successful. 174 How-
171. N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 3.
172. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 13, 1972, § IA, at 1, col. 1. See also Wilson, He Threw the
Rascals Out, N. Y. Magazine, Oct. 2, 1972, at 38 (detailing activities of United States Attorney
in New Jersey who successfully prosecuted several Newark officials).
173. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1972, at 1, col. 1. Reportedly, Manhattan District Attorney
Frank Hogan "reached the conclusion that ...the Governor had exceeded his executive
authority because he did not-and could not--show why the District Attorneys must be
superseded." Id. at 33, col. 4.
174. See Remarks of N.Y. District Attorney Frank Hogan in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1972, at 1,
col 6.
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ever, as in civil litigation, the mere threat appears to have accomplished
its purpose of exerting pressure upon the special prosecutor to retreat
from his position that he alone would be responsible for prosecuting all
cases arising under the order.175
Notwithstanding its expeditious use in this situation, the power of
superseder is a two-edged sword, a power which could be unscrupulously
used to immunize political friends and even to prevent scrutiny of cor-
ruption in a governor's own administration. This concern, apparently
imaginary in 1973, nevertheless demonstrates that superseder without
limitations could present very serious problems in the future. Thus, it
does seem appropriate to insure access to the courts. Certainly, some
narrow standard of review would not interfere too greatly with the execu-
tive power, and yet could protect the public from arbitrary and capricious
executive action-a protection especially important in a state which has
no recall provisions176 and elects state officials only every four years.
In fact, it may be unfortunate that an action in the nature of prohibi-
tion will apparently not be taken, since it would settle questions sur-
rounding the order of superseder before they could be raised by a
defendant indicted by a special grand jury in an attempt to prevent his
conviction or to delay the serving of sentence upon his conviction while
the courts decide the issues. Moreover, because of possible standing to
raise broader issues, it seems that a legal proceeding brought by a dis-
trict attorney to challenge the superseder order would prompt more
penetrating judicial scrutiny of the questions presented than would a
proceeding brought by a criminal defendant. Perhaps in accommodating
some of the less significant objections to his authority, the special prose-
cutor was motivated by a desire in effect to preclude any meaningful
challenge to the executive order.
The special prosecutor can perform a vital function for the State and
175. The agreement between the Special Prosecutor and the District Attorneys of the
five counties of New York City provides that the latter will be responsible for prosecuting
the large majority of corruption cases whether based upon investigations commenced before or
after the effective date of the order. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1972, at 1, col 4 "[T]he special
prosecutor will conduct those investigations which he determines after he has reviewed them
with the District Attorneys and given a reason for so doing." Id. at 35, col. 1. This in effect
amends, if not radically changes, the terms of the executive order. See Remarks of District
Attorney Hogan, reported in N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1972, at 1, col 3. No written agreement on
any given case will be kept, ostensibly to avoid any leaks. But who is going to remember the
specifics of the prosecutors' consultations? While it it true that the implementation of the
order requires clarification, especially to avoid duplicity in investigations as well as disclosure,
such an accommodation could have been reached without requiring review by and explana-
tions to the district attorneys before the special prosecutor may prosecute. It is difficult to
speculate whether such an arrangement will "dry up" sources of information.
176. The constitution does, however, provide for impeachment. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 24.
See text accompanying notes 81-122 supra.
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City of New York by returning justice to the criminal justice system in
the City. Unfortunately, thus far the public reception from the super-
seded district attorneys has been less than warm. The concessions
made by the Special Prosecutor may so narrowly limit the scope of his
duties that it becomes questionable whether a new bureaucracy in each
of the boroughs is really necessary or desirable in terms of the finances
involved and the ill-will engendered.1 7 Moreover, if the new bureaucracy
breeds ennui on the part of the public, this very important and necessary
undertaking could be crippled before it begins.
The necessity for executive action in light of the corruption in New
York City is beyond question. The wisdom of the measure taken, as well
as the manner in which it was executed, may be open to debate, but
the action itself was not illegal. The effectiveness of the measure, of
course, must await the test of time.
177. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1972, at 28, col. 1.
178. While the fear that the special prosecutor will narrowly confine his duties may not
be real, at least in highly publicized crimes relating to corruption, the constant public struggle
for power between the superseded district attorneys and the special prosecutor could result
in public contempt for all concerned. See note 116 supra. The special prosecutor's alleged
"quest for publicity" has been a source of criticism. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1972, at 30,
col. 2. See also Plate, Who Is the New Super prosecutor Really After?, New York Mag.,
Jan. 29, 1973, at 29, 33.
